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We study the problem of finding a small subset of items that is agreeable
to all agents, meaning that all agents value the subset at least as much as its
complement. Previous work has shown worst-case bounds, over all instances
with a given number of agents and items, on the number of items that may
need to be included in such a subset. Our goal in this paper is to efficiently
compute an agreeable subset whose size approximates the size of the smallest
agreeable subset for a given instance. We consider three well-known models
for representing the preferences of the agents: ordinal preferences on single
items, the value oracle model, and additive utilities. In each of these models,
we establish virtually tight bounds on the approximation ratio that can be
obtained by algorithms running in polynomial time.
1. Introduction
A typical resource allocation problem involves dividing a set of resources among inter-
ested agents. We are often concerned with the efficiency of the allocation, e.g., achieving
high social welfare or ensuring that there is no other allocation that would make every
agent better off than in the current allocation. Another important issue is the fairness
of the allocation. For example, we might want the resulting allocation to be envy-free,
meaning that every agent regards her bundle as the best among the bundles in the
allocation [13, 31], or proportional, meaning that every agent obtains at least her pro-
portionally fair share [28]. A common feature of such problems is that one agent’s gain is
another agent’s loss: the setting inherently puts the agents in conflict with one another,
and our task is to try to resolve this conflict as best we can according to our objectives.
We consider a variant of the resource allocation problem where instead of the agents
being pitted against one another, they belong to one and the same group. We will
collectively allocate a subset of items to this group, and our goal is to make this subset
“agreeable” to all agents. Agreeability can be thought of as a minimal desirability
condition: While an agent may be able to find other subsets of items that she personally
∗A preliminary version of this paper appeared in Proceedings of the 26th International Joint Conference
on Artificial Intelligence, July 2017.
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prefers, the current set is still acceptable for her and she can agree with the allocation of
the set to the group. Without further constraints, the problem described so far would be
trivial, since we could simply allocate the whole set of items to the agents. We therefore
impose a constraint that the allocated subset should be small. This constraint on size is
reasonable in a variety of settings. For instance, the agents could be going together on
a trip and there is limited space in the luggage. Alternatively, they could be receiving
some items in a resource allocation setting where the preferences of the other groups are
not known or are given lower priority, perhaps because the groups have not arrived or
are placed lower in a team competition, so we want the subset to be agreeable to the
first group while leaving as many items as possible to the remaining groups.
The problem of allocating a small agreeable subset of items was first studied by Suk-
sompong, who defined the notion of agreeability based on the fairness notion of envy-
freeness [29]. A subset of items is said to be agreeable to an agent if the agent likes it at
least as much as the complement set. Agreeability, or minor variants thereof, has been
considered in the context of fair division, where each group consists of a single agent
[4, 7, 3]. In the example of agents going together on a trip, a subset of items that they
take is agreeable if they weakly prefer it to the complement subset of items left at home.
In the resource allocation example, assuming that we allocate resources between two
groups, a subset is agreeable to the first group if no agent in the group would rather
switch to the second group. Suksompong showed a tight upper bound on the number
of items that may need to be included in the set in order for it to be agreeable to all
agents. In particular, for every additional agent, the worst-case bound increases by ap-
proximately half an item. This result is rather surprising, since agents can have very
different preferences on the items, and yet we only need to pay a relatively mild cost
for each extra agent to keep agreeability satisfied for the whole group. When there are
two or three agents, Suksompong also gave polynomial-time algorithms that compute
an agreeable subset whose size matches the worst-case bound.
While Suksompong’s results are quite intriguing, some important issues were left un-
addressed by his work. Firstly, in many instances, an agreeable subset of smallest size is
much smaller than the worst-case bound over all instances with that number of agents
and items. Indeed, an extreme example is when there is a single item that every agent
likes better than all of the remaining items combined. In this case, it suffices to allocate
that item. This results in a much smaller set than the worst-case bound, which is at
least half of the items for any number of agents. Secondly, even if we were content with
finding a subset that matches the worst-case bound, we might not be able to compute it
efficiently, thus rendering the existence result impractical when the number of agents or
items is large. A related issue is that of eliciting the preferences on subsets of items from
the agents. Since there are an exponential number of subsets, the burden on the agents
to determine their preferences and the amount of information that they need to submit
to our algorithm is potentially huge. This issue can be circumvented by relying on pref-
erences over single items or allowing the algorithm to query the agents’ preferences on a
need-to-know basis, as is the case for Suksompong’s polynomial time algorithm for two
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and three agents, respectively.1
In this paper, we address all of these issues and investigate the problem of computing
an agreeable subset of approximately optimal size for a given instance, as opposed to one
whose size is close to the worst-case bound over all instances with that number of agents
and items. We tackle the problem using several models that are well-studied in the
literature and present computationally efficient algorithms for computing an agreeable
subset of approximately optimal size in each of them. Moreover, in all of the models we
show that our approximation bounds are virtually tight.
In Section 3, we assume that we only have access to the agents’ ordinal preferences on
single items rather than subsets of items. Models of this type offer the advantage that
the associated algorithms are often simple to implement and the agents do not need to
give away or even determine their entire utility functions; such models have therefore
received widespread attention [19, 4, 3]. With only the ordinal preferences on single items
in hand, however, most of the time we cannot tell whether a certain subset is agreeable
to an agent or not. Nevertheless, by assuming that preferences are responsive, we can
extend preferences on single items to partial preferences on subsets. We show that for
any constant number of agents, there exists a subset of m2 + o(m) items that is always
agreeable as long as the full responsive preferences are consistent with the rankings over
single items. Since a necessarily agreeable subset always consists of at least m2 items
even for one agent, this bound is essentially tight. We also present a simple randomized
algorithm and a deterministic algorithm, both running in polynomial time, to compute
such a subset.
Next, in Section 4, we consider general preferences using the value oracle model [12],
where the preferences of the agents are represented by utility functions and we are allowed
to query the utility of an agent for any subset. We exhibit an efficient approximation
algorithm with approximation ratio O(m ln lnm/ lnm) in this model. While this may
not seem impressive since the trivial algorithm that always outputs the whole set of items
already achieves approximation ratio O(m), we also show that our ratio is essentially the
best we can hope for. In particular, there does not exist a polynomial time algorithm
with approximation ratio o(m/ lnm).
Finally, in Section 5, we assume that the agents are endowed with additive utility
functions. Additivity provides a reasonable tradeoff between simplicity and expressive-
ness; it is commonly assumed in the literature, especially recently [2, 5, 8]. We show
that under additive valuations, it is NP-hard to decide whether there exists an agreeable
set containing exactly half of the items even where there are only two agents. On the
other hand, using results on covering integer programs, we demonstrate the existence of
an O(lnn)-approximation algorithm for computing a minimum size agreeable set. More-
over, we show that this is tight: It is NP-hard to approximate the problem to within a
factor of (1− δ) ln n for any δ > 0.
1Note that if the algorithm elicits the whole preference relations from the agents, this elicitation step
alone already prevents the algorithm from running in time polynomial in the number of items.
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2. Preliminaries
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} denote the set of agents, and S = {x1, x2, . . . , xm} the set of
items. The agents in N will be collectively allocated a subset of items in S. Denote by
S the set of all subsets of S. Each agent i is endowed with a preference relation i, a
reflexive, complete, and transitive ordering over S. Let ≻i denote the strict part and ∼i
the indifference part of the relation i. For items x and y, we will sometimes write x  y
to mean {x}  {y}. We assume throughout the paper that preferences are monotonic,
i.e., T ∪ {x}  T for all T ⊆ S and x ∈ S.
We are interested in when a set of items is agreeable to an agent. To this end, we
must precisely define what agreeability means. The notion of agreeability, defined by
Suksompong [29], is based on the fairness concept of envy-freeness. A subset is considered
to be agreeable to an agent if the agent likes it at least as much as the complement set.
Put differently, if the complement set is allocated to another agent, then the former
agent does not envy the latter.
Definition 1. A subset T ⊆ S of items is said to be agreeable to agent i if T i S\T .
Next, we define a property of preferences called responsiveness, which says that an
agent cannot be worse off whenever an item is added to her set or replaced by an-
other item that she weakly prefers to the original item. Responsiveness is a reasonable
assumption in many settings and has been widely studied in the literature [6, 7].
Definition 2. A preference  on S is called responsive if it satisfies the following two
conditions:
• T ∪ {x}  T for all T ⊆ S and x ∈ S (monotonicity);
• T\{y} ∪ {x}  T for all T ⊆ S and x, y ∈ S such that x  y, x 6∈ T and y ∈ T .
When preferences are responsive, it sometimes suffices to know an agent’s preference
on single items (i.e., the restriction of i to subsets consisting of single items) in order
to deduce that the agent regards a subset as agreeable. This intuition is formalized in
the next definition.
Definition 3. Fix a preference sing on single items in S. A subset T ⊆ S is neces-
sarily agreeable with respect to sing if T  S\T for any responsive preference  on S
consistent with sing.
The following characterization of necessary agreeability will be useful for our results
in Section 3.
Lemma 1 ([29]). Fix a preference sing on single items in S with
x1 sing x2 sing · · · sing xm.
Let T ⊆ S, and define Ik = {x1, x2, . . . , xk} for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}. If
|Ik ∩ T | ≥ k
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for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, then T is necessarily agreeable with respect to sing. The
converse also holds if the preference sing is strict.
4
3. Ordinal Preferences on Single Items
In this section, we assume that we only have at our disposal the agents’ ordinal pref-
erences on single items. We are interested in computing a small necessarily agreeable
subset that is consistent with these preferences. If we had access to the agents’ pref-
erences over all subsets of items, it is known that we could always find a subset of
size
⌊
m+n
2
⌋
that is agreeable to all n agents [29]. It is not clear, however, how much
extra “penalty” we have to pay for the information restriction that we are imposing.
It could be, for example, that with three agents there exist preferences for which we
have to include up to 2m3 or
3m
4 items in a necessarily agreeable subset. We show that
this is in fact not the case—there always exists a necessarily agreeable subset of size
m
2 +O(
√
m log logm) as long as the number of agents is constant.
For the proof of our first result, we will require the law of the iterated logarithm,
which gives a bound for the fluctuations of a random walk.
Lemma 2 (Law of the iterated logarithm [18, 21]). Let X1,X2, . . . be independent and
identically distributed random variables with mean 0 and variance 1. Let Sn := X1 +
· · ·+Xn. Then
lim sup
n→∞
Sn√
n log log n
=
√
2
almost surely.
Theorem 1. If the number of agents is constant, then there exists a subset of size
m
2 + O(
√
m log logm) that is necessarily agreeable with respect to the preferences on
single items of all agents.
We remark that when there are two agents, Suksompong’s algorithm computes a
necessarily agreeable subset of size
⌊
m
2
⌋
+ 1, which is also the optimal bound for an
agreeable subset for two agents even if we know their full preferences.
Proof. Let X1,X2, . . . ,Xm be independent random variables taking values 1 or −1. We
will take Xi = 1 to mean that item xi is included in our subset, and Xi = −1 to mean
that it is excluded from the subset.
Consider an arbitrary agent j. Suppose that she ranks the single items as
xσj(1) j xσj(2) j · · · j xσj(m).
Using Lemma 1, we find that our subset is necessarily agreeable for the agent if
Xσj(1) + · · ·+Xσj(i) ≥ 0
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Let Sji := Xσj(1) + · · · + Xσj(i), and independently set each Xi to be 1 or −1 with
probability 12 each. Lemma 2 implies that for large enough k (and m), we have S
j
i ≤
2
√
i log log i (and by symmetry, −Sji ≥ −2
√
i log log i) for all i ≥ k with high probability.
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This means that for large enough m, |Sji | ≤ 2
√
m log logm for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m with high
probability as well.
Since n is constant, by the union bound we find that for sufficiently large m, we can
initialize the random variables X1, . . . ,Xm so that |Sji | ≤ 2
√
m log logm for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m
and all j. We will modify the choice of Xi’s slightly. For each agent, include her most
preferred
√
m log logm items that have so far been excluded. Thus, we have Sji ≥ 0 for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ m and all j, and our selected subset includes at most
m
2
+ (n+ 1) ·
√
m log logm =
m
2
+O(
√
m log logm)
items, as desired.
Theorem 1 yields a simple randomized polynomial time algorithm that finds a neces-
sarily agreeable subset for multiple agents by first choosing independently and uniformly
at random whether to include each item, and then modifying the selection by including
the most preferred
√
m log logm items of each agent that have been excluded.
Next, we present a deterministic polynomial time algorithm that finds a necessarily
agreeable subset of size m/2 + o(m) for all agents. We will need the following classical
result in combinatorics.
Lemma 3 ([10]). Any sequence of at least (r−1)(s−1)+1 distinct real numbers contains
either an increasing subsequence of length r or a decreasing subsequence of length s.
Theorem 2. If the number of agents is constant, then there exists a deterministic al-
gorithm, running in time polynomial in the number of items, that computes a subset of
size m2 +o(m) that is necessarily agreeable with respect to the preferences on single items
of all agents.
Proof. We first observe that when there are m items and two agents whose preferences
on these items are the opposite of each other, we can choose a subset of size at most m2 +1
that is necessarily agreeable to both agents. To see this, suppose that the preferences
on single items of the two agents are
x1 1 x2 1 · · · 1 xm
and
xm 2 xm−1 2 · · · 2 x1.
If m is odd, it suffices to choose items x1, x3, x5, . . . , xm, while if m is even, it suffices to
choose items x1, x3, x5, . . . , xm−1 along with item xm.
Now, consider our group of n agents. Assume without loss of generality that the
preference on single items of agent 1 is
x1 1 x2 1 · · · 1 xm.
Using Lemma 3, from the preference on single items of agent 2, we can find either an
increasing subsequence or a decreasing subsequence of length
√
m on the indices of the
6
items. Applying Lemma 3 again, we find a subsequence of this subsequence of length
m1/4 that is either increasing or decreasing in the preference on single items of agent 3.
Proceeding in this manner, we find a subsequence of m1/2
n−1
items whose indices appear
either in that order or in the reverse order in every agent’s preference on single items.
By our observation above, we can choose a subset of at most 12m
1/2n−1 +1 items that is
necessarily agreeable for every agent with respect to this set of m1/2
n−1
items.
Let t := 2n−1. Note that if a set A of items is necessarily agreeable when the universe
of items is taken to be B ⊇ A, and another set C of items is necessarily agreeable with
respect to the same preference on single items when the universe of items is D ⊇ C
disjoint from B, then A ∪ C is necessarily agreeable with respect to that preference
when the universe of items is B ∪D. To obtain our necessarily agreeable subset for all
agents, we proceed as follows. When there are k items left, we choose a subset of k
1
t
items as above. Within that subset, we choose a subset of at most 12k
1
t +1 items that is
necessarily agreeable for all agents with respect to the k
1
t items, and we remove the k
1
t
items from consideration. In the first step, we decrease the number of items by a factor
of 1− 1/m(t−1)/t, and this factor only decreases in subsequent steps. Hence the number
of steps is at most
log 1m
log
(
1− 1
m(t−1)/t
) ≈ logm1
m(t−1)/t
= m
t−1
t logm,
which implies that our chosen subset exceeds half of the items by o(m) items. Moreover,
since each step involves finding a longest increasing or decreasing subsequence from a list
of length at most m for a constant number of agents, the algorithm runs in polynomial
time.
Although the algorithm in Theorem 2 has the advantage of being deterministic, the
expected number of repetitions of the randomized algorithm in Theorem 1 is very low; in
fact, this value is roughly 1 since the algorithm succeeds with high probability. Therefore,
we think that the algorithm from Theorem 1 should be preferred in general due to its
speed and ease of implementation as well as its superior guarantee.
4. General Preferences
While our algorithms from the previous section always find an agreeable set of size at
most m2 + o(m), it is unclear how small this set is compared to the optimal if we have
information beyond preferences on single items. In other words, our results so far do not
yield any guarantee on the approximation ratio beyond the obvious O(m) upper bound
for arbitrary preferences over subsets of items. The goal of this section is to explore
the possibilities and limitations of achieving better approximation ratios in this general
setting.
Before we move on to our results, let us be more precise about the model we are
working with. First, since each agent’s preference is reflexive, complete and transitive,
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there is a utility function ui : S → [0, 1] such that T i T ′ if and only if ui(T ) ≥ ui(T ′);
for convenience, we work with these utility functions instead of working directly with
the preferences themselves. Since the number of subsets in S is exponentially large,
the utility functions take exponential space to write down. Hence, it is undesirable to
include them as part of the input. Instead, we will work with the value oracle model [12],
in which the algorithm can query u1(T ), . . . , un(T ) for each subset T ⊆ S.2 Finally, we
note that we do not assume responsiveness of the agents’ preferences in this section.
Our first result is a simple polynomial time approximation algorithm with approx-
imation ratio O(m ln lnm/ lnm). Even though this approximation guarantee is only
Ω(lnm/ ln lnm) better than the obvious O(m) bound, we will see later that this is al-
most the best one can hope for in polynomial time.
Theorem 3. For any constant ε > 0, there exists a deterministic (εm ln lnm/ lnm)-
approximation algorithm for finding a minimum size agreeable set that runs in time
polynomial in the number of agents and items.
Our algorithm works as follows. First, we query the agents’ utilities on (lnm/ ln lnm)-
size subsets T1, . . . , Tpoly(m), which are to be specified. If any of these subsets are agree-
able, then we output one such subset. Otherwise, we output the whole set S.
To argue about the approximation ratio of the algorithm, we need to show that, if
there is a small agreeable subset T ∗ ⊆ S (of size O(lnm/ ln lnm)), then at least one of
T1, . . . , Tpoly(m) is agreeable. A sufficient condition for this is that every subset T ⊆ S
of small size is contained in at least one Ti. A similar question has been studied before
in combinatorics under the name covering design [15]. Here we will use a construction
by Rees et al., stated formally below.
Lemma 4 ([27]). For any set S with |S| = m and any positive integers p, q such that
pq ≤ m, there exists a deterministic algorithm that outputs subsets T1, . . . , T(⌈m/p⌉q ) ⊆ S
of size pq such that, for any subset T ⊆ S of size at most q, T is contained in Ti for
some i. Moreover, the running time of the algorithm is polynomial in m and
(⌈m/p⌉
q
)
.
We give a short proof of Lemma 4, which is taken from Rees et al.’s work but modified
with the desired range of the parameters.
Proof of Lemma 4. First, partition S into ⌈m/p⌉ parts S1, . . . , S⌈m/p⌉ where each part is
of size at most p. Each set Ti is simply a union of q different Sj’s. Note that if the union
is of size smaller than pq, we can simply add arbitrary elements of S into it to make its
size exactly pq. Clearly, there are
(⌈m/p⌉
q
)
such unions and T1, . . . , T(⌈m/p⌉q )
satisfy the
properties required in the theorem.
With this lemma in place, we are ready to prove Theorem 3.
2When a polynomial number of queries are allowed, it is not hard to see that the value oracle model
can be simulated with the preference oracle model (e.g., [29]), in which the algorithm is allowed to
query the relative preference of an agent between any two subsets, and vice-versa.
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Proof of Theorem 3. Our algorithm starts by evoking the algorithm from Lemma 4 with
q = ⌊lnm/(ε ln lnm)⌋ and p = ⌊εm ln lnm/(q lnm)⌋ to produce subsets T1, . . . , Tℓ ⊆ S
of size pq where ℓ =
(⌈m/p⌉
q
)
. For each i = 1, . . . , ℓ, we query u1(Ti), . . . , un(Ti), u1(S \
Ti), . . . , un(S \ Ti) to check whether Ti is agreeable. If any Ti is agreeable, we output it.
Otherwise, output the whole set S. Clearly, the output set is always agreeable.
Moreover, observe that, from our choice of p, q, we have
ℓ =
(⌈m/p⌉
q
)
≤ (e⌈m/p⌉/q)q
= (O(lnm))q
= exp(O(q ln lnm))
= exp(O(lnm)),
which is polynomial in m. Hence, the running time of our algorithm is polynomial in m
and n.
To prove the algorithm’s approximation guarantee, let us consider two cases. First,
if the optimal agreeable set has size more than q, then since we output a set of size at
most m, we obtain an approximation ratio of at most m/(q + 1) ≤ εm ln lnm/ lnm.
On the other hand, if the optimal agreeable set T ∗ has size at most q, then by con-
struction, there exists i such that T ∗ ⊆ Ti. Since T ∗ is agreeable, Ti is also agreeable.
Hence, our output set has size pq ≤ εm ln lnm/ lnm, which implies an approximation
ratio of εm ln lnm/ lnm as well.
While our algorithm may seem rather naive, we will show next that its approximation
guarantee is, up to O(ln lnm) factor, essentially the best one can hope for, even when
there is only one agent:
Theorem 4. For every constant c > 0 and every sufficiently large m (depending on
c), there is no (possibly randomized and adaptive) algorithm that makes at most mc/8
queries and always outputs an agreeable set with expected size at most m/(c lnm) times
the optimum, even when there is only one agent.
In other words, the above theorem implies that there is no polynomial time algorithm
with approximation ratio o(m/ lnm). We note here that our lower bound is information-
theoretic and is not based on any computational complexity assumptions. Moreover, it
rules out any algorithm that makes a polynomial number of queries, not only those that
run in polynomial time.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let g : S → [0, 1] be defined by
g(T ) =
{
1 if |T | ≥ m/2,
0 otherwise.
Moreover, for each subset T ∗ ⊆ S, let fT ∗ : S → [0, 1] denote the function
fT ∗(T ) =
{
1 if |T | ≥ m/2 or T ∗ ⊆ T,
0 otherwise.
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That is, fT ∗ is g together with a planted solution T
∗.
Consider any algorithm A that makes at most mc/8 queries. Assume for the moment
that A is deterministic. Let us examine a run of A when the agent’s utility is g. Suppose
that A’s queries to g are T1, . . . , T⌊mc/8⌋ ⊆ S.
Let T ∗ be a random subset of S of size ⌊c lnm/4⌋. Let us now consider the queries A
made when the agent’s utility is fT ∗; suppose that the queries made are T
′
1, . . . , T
′
⌊mc/8⌋
⊆
S. For every j = 1, . . . , ⌊mc/8⌋, if T1 = T ′1, . . . , Tj−1 = T ′j−1 and g(T1) = fT ∗(T ′1), . . . , g(Tj−1) =
fT ∗(T
′
j−1), then A goes through the same computation route for both g and fT ∗ , and
hence Tj = T
′
j . Moreover, when both runs share the same computational route so far
and Tj = T
′
j , we can bound the probability that g(Tj) 6= fT ∗(T ′j) as follows. First, if
|Tj | ≥ m/2, then g(Tj) is always equal to fT ∗(T ′j). Otherwise, since Tj is independent of
T ∗, we have
Pr[g(Tj) 6= fT ∗(T ′j)] = Pr[g(Tj) 6= fT ∗(Tj)]
= Pr[T ∗ ⊆ Tj ]
=
( |Tj |
⌊c lnm/4⌋
)
(
n
⌊c lnm/4⌋
)
≤
( |Tj |
n
)⌊c lnm/4⌋
≤ 2−⌊c lnm/4⌋
≤ 2m−c/6.
Hence, by union bound, the probability that the two sequences of queries are not iden-
tical is at most (2m−c/6) ·mc/8 = 2m−c/24, which is less than 1/2 when m is sufficiently
large. Furthermore, observe that when the two sequences are identical, A must output
an agreeable subset for g, which is of size at least m/2. Thus, the expected size of the
output of A on fT ∗ is more than m/2 · (1/2) = m/4. However, the optimal agreeable
set for fT ∗ has size only ⌊c lnm/4⌋. As a result, the expected size of the output of A is
more than m/(c lnm) times the optimum as desired.
Finally, note that if A is randomized, we can use the above argument on each choice
of randomness and average over all the choices, which gives a similar conclusion.
5. Additive Utilities
In this section, we assume that the agents’ preferences are represented by additive utility
functions. Each agent i has some nonnegative utility ui(xj) for item xj, and ui(T ) =∑
x∈T ui(x) for any i ∈ N and any subset of items T ⊆ S.
Clearly, the problem of deciding whether there exists an agreeable set of a certain size
is in NP. Moreover, the following theorem shows that it is indeed NP-complete, even
when there are two agents with additive utility functions.
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Theorem 5. Even when there are two agents with additive utility functions, it is NP-
hard to decide whether there is an agreeable set of size exactly m2 .
Proof. We will reduce from the following problem called Balanced 2-Partition: given
a multiset A of non-negative integers, decide whether there exists a subset B ⊆ A such
that |B| = |A \B| = |A|/2 and ∑a∈B a =∑a∈A\B a =∑a∈A a/2.
Like the well-known 2-Partition where the cardinality constraint is not included,
Balanced 2-Partition is NP-hard. For completeness, we give a simple proof of NP-
hardness of Balanced 2-Partition in Appendix A.
The reduction from Balanced 2-Partition proceeds as follows. Let a1, . . . , a|A| be
the elements of A. The set S contains |A| items x1, . . . , x|A|, each associated with an
element of A. The utility function is then defined by u1(xi) = ai and u2(xi) = M − ai
where M =
∑
a∈A a. We will next show that this reduction is indeed a valid reduction.
(YES Case) Suppose that there exists B ⊆ A such that |B| = |A|/2 and ∑a∈B a =∑
a∈A a/2. We can simply pick T to be all the items corresponding to the elements in
B. It is obvious that T has size |A|/2 = m/2 and that T is agreeable.
(NO Case) We prove the contrapositive; suppose that there is an agreeable subset
T ⊆ S of size m/2. Let B be the corresponding elements in A of all the items in
T . Since T is agreeable,
∑
x∈T ui(x) ≥
∑
x∈S\T ui(x) for i ∈ {1, 2}. When i = 1,
this implies that
∑
a∈B a ≥
∑
a∈A a/2. Moreover, when i = 2, using the fact that
|T | = m/2, we have ∑a∈B a ≤ ∑a∈A a/2. Thus, ∑a∈B a = ∑a∈A a/2. Finally, note
that |B| = m/2 = |A|/2. Hence, A is a YES instance for Balanced 2-Partition.
Theorem 5 shows that the problem is weakly NP-hard even when there are two agents.
Nevertheless, when the number of agents is constant, there exists a pseudo-polynomial
time dynamic programming algorithm for computing an optimal agreeable set. In par-
ticular, the problem is not strongly NP-hard for a constant number of agents.
Theorem 6. If the number of agents is constant, then there exists a pseudo-polynomial
time algorithm that computes an agreeable set of minimum size.
Proof. The algorithm uses dynamic programming. Assume that the utilities of agent i for
the items are integers with sum σi. We construct a table Σ of size (m+1)(σ1+1) . . . (σn+
1), where for each 0 ≤ m′ ≤ m and each tuple (y1, . . . , yn) with 0 ≤ yi ≤ σi, the entry
Σ(m′, y1, . . . , yn) of the table corresponds to the minimum number of items from among
the first m′ items that we need to include so that agent i has utility exactly yi for all
i (if this is achievable). Initially we have Σ(0, 0, . . . , 0) = 0 and Σ(m′, y1, . . . , yn) = ∞
otherwise. We then iterate through the values ofm′ in increasing order. For each m′ ≥ 1,
we update the entries of the table as follows:
• If ui(xm′) ≤ yi for all i and
1 + Σ
(
m′ − 1, y1 − u1(xm′) . . . , yn − un(xm′)
)
< Σ(m′ − 1, y1, . . . , yn),
let Σ(m′, y1, . . . , yn) = 1 + Σ (m
′ − 1, y1 − u1(xm′) . . . , yn − un(xm′)).
• Else, let Σ(m′, y1, . . . , yn) = Σ(m′ − 1, y1, . . . , yn).
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Finally, we look up the entries Σ(m, y1, . . . , yn) for which yi ≥ σi2 holds for all i and
return the minimum value over all such entries. This algorithm takes time O(mσ1 . . . σn).
Note that if we also want to return an agreeable set (rather than just the minimum size),
we can also keep track of the sets of items along with the values in our table.
While there is a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for the problem when the number
of agents is fixed, we show below that when the number of agents is not fixed, the
problem becomes strongly NP-hard. In other words, there is no pseudo-polynomial time
algorithm for this variation unless P=NP.
Theorem 7. When the number of agents is given as part of the input, it is strongly
NP-hard to decide whether there is an agreeable set of size exactly m+12 .
Proof. We will reduce from 3SAT. Given a 3SAT formula φ with m′ clauses C1, . . . , Cm′
on n′ variables y1, . . . , yn′ , let there be n = m
′ + n′ agents C1, . . . , Cm′ , y1, . . . , yn′ and
m = 2n′ + 1 items where 2n′ items correspond to all the literals y1,¬y1, . . . , yn′ ,¬yn′
and the remaining item is called a. The utility function is defined by
uCi(b) =


1 if b = a,
1 if the literal b is present in Ci,
0 otherwise,
and
uyi(b) =


1 if b = a,
1 if b = yi or b = ¬yi
0 otherwise.
We will next show that this is a valid reduction. First, note that all the integer param-
eters are now polynomial in the size of the input. Hence, we are left to show that YES
and NO instances of 3SAT map to YES and NO instances of our problem respectively.
(YES Case) Suppose that there exists an assignment that satisfies φ. For each yi,
let bi be the literal of yi that is true according to this assignment. Let the set T be
{a, b1, . . . , bn′}. Since each Cj is satisfied by the assignment, we have
∑n′
i=1 uCj (bi) ≥ 1.
Hence, we have
∑
x∈T uCj (x) ≥ 2, which implies that T Cj S \ T .
Moreover, for each variable yi,
∑
x∈T uyi(x) = 2, which also implies that T yi S \ T .
As a result, T is an agreeable set of size n′ + 1 = m+12 as desired.
(NO Case) We again prove the contrapositive; suppose that there exists an agreeable
set T ⊆ S of size m+12 = n′ + 1. We can assume without loss of generality that a ∈ T .
Indeed, since the utility of any agent for a is at least as much as the utility of the agent
for any other item, if a /∈ T , we can remove an arbitrary item from T and add a in while
maintaining the agreeability of T . Moreover, we also assume without loss of generality
that each clause of φ has at least two variables—it is obvious that every 3SAT formula
can be transformed to this form in polynomial time.
Since T yi S \ T , at least one literal corresponding to yi is included in T . Moreover,
since the size of T is n′ + 1 and a ∈ T , exactly one literal of each yi is in T ; let bi be
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this literal. Consider the assignment to the variables such that all the bi’s are satisfied.
Since T Cj S \ T for every Cj and Cj contains at least two literals, at least one literal
in Cj is satisfied by this assignment. Hence, this assignment satisfies the formula φ.
Given that finding an agreeable set of minimum size is NP-hard, it is natural to
attempt to find an approximation algorithm for the problem. When the utilities are
additive, this turns out to be closely related to approximating the classical problem Set
Cover. In Set Cover, we are given a ground set U and a collection C of subsets of U .
The goal is to select a minimum number of subsets whose union is the entire set U .
Set Cover was one of the first problems shown to be NP-hard in Karp’s seminal
paper [17]. Since then, its approximability has been intensely studied and has, by now,
been well understood. A simple greedy algorithm is known to yield a (ln |U | + 1)-
approximation for the problem [16, 22]. On the other hand, a long line of work in
hardness of approximation [23, 26, 11, 1, 25] culminates in Dinur and Steurer’s work, in
which a (1 − ε) ln |U | ratio NP-hardness of approximation for Set Cover was proved
for every constant ε > 0 [9].
The first connection we will make between Set Cover and approximating minimum
size agreeable set is on the negative side—we will show that any inapproximability result
of Set Cover can be translated to that of approximating minimum size agreeable set
as well. To do so, we will first state Dinur and Steurer’s result more precisely.
Lemma 5 ([9]). For every constant ε > 0, there is a polynomial time reduction from
any 3SAT formula φ to a Set Cover instance (U, C) and f(U) = poly(|U |) such that
• (Completeness) if φ is satisfiable, the optimum of (U, C) is at most f(U).
• (Soundness) if φ is unsatisfiable, the optimum of (U, C) is at least ((1−ε) ln |U |)f(U).
We are now ready to prove hardness of approximation for minimum size agreeable set.
Theorem 8. For any constant δ > 0, it is NP-hard to approximate minimum size
agreeable set to within a factor (1− δ) ln n of the optimum.
Proof. Let ε = δ/2. Given a 3SAT formula φ, we first use Dinur-Steurer reduction
to produce a Set Cover instance (U, C). Let there be |U | agents, each of whom is
associated with each element of U ; it is convenient to think of the set of agents as simply
N = U . As for the items, let there be one item for each subset C ∈ C and additionally
let there be one special item called t; in other words, S = C ∪ {t}.
The utility for each a ∈ U is then defined by
ua(s) =


|{C ∈ C | a ∈ C}| − 1 if s = t,
1 if s ∈ C and a ∈ s,
0 otherwise.
We show next that this reduction indeed gives the desired inapproximability result.
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(Completeness) If φ is satisfiable, then there are f(|U |) subsets from C that together
cover U . We can take T to contain all these subsets and the special item t. Clearly, T
has size f(|U |) + 1 and is agreeable.
(Soundness) If φ is unsatisfiable, then any set cover of (S, C) contains at least ((1 −
ε) ln |U |)f(|U |) subsets. Consider any agreeable set T . For each a ∈ U , from our choice
of ua(t), T must include at least one subset that contains a. In other words, T \ {t} is
a set cover of (S, C). Hence, |T | must also be at least ((1 − ε) ln |U |)f(|U |).
Thus, it is NP-hard to approximate minimum size agreeable set to within ((1−ε) ln |U |)f(|U |)f(|U |)+1
of the optimum. This ratio is at least (1 − δ) ln n when the number of agents, n = |U |,
is sufficiently large.
Unlike the above inapproximability result, it is unclear how algorithms for Set Cover
can be used to approximate minimum size agreeable set. Fortunately, our problem is
in fact a special case of a generalization of Set Cover called Covering Integer
Program (CIP), which can be written as follows:
minimize cTx
subject to Ax ≥ 1,
0 ≤ x ≤ u
x ∈ Zm
where c, u ∈ Rm and A ∈ Rn×m are given as input.
The problem of finding a minimum size agreeable set can then be formulated in this
form simply by setting c, u and A as follows.
cs = 1 ∀s ∈ S
us = 1 ∀s ∈ S
Ai,s =
2ui(s)∑
s′∈S ui(s
′)
∀i ∈ N, s ∈ S
Similarly to Set Cover, approximability of CIP has been well studied; specifically,
the problem is known to be approximable to within O(lnn) of the optimum in polynomial
time [20]. This immediately implies an O(lnn)-approximation algorithm for finding a
minimum size agreeable set as well:
Theorem 9. When the agents’ utility functions are additive, there is a polynomial time
O(lnn)-approximation algorithm for finding a minimum size agreeable set.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we study the problem of efficiently computing an approximately optimal
agreeable set of items. We consider three well-known models for representing the pref-
erences of the agents and derive essentially tight bounds on the approximation ratio
that can be achieved in polynomial time in each model. When we only have access to
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agents’ rankings on single items and the number of agents is constant, we can efficiently
compute a necessarily agreeable subset of size m2 +O(
√
m log logm); this is almost tight
since any such subset must contain at least m2 items. Next, for general preferences,
we exhibit an efficient algorithm with approximation ratio O(m ln lnm/ lnm) under the
value oracle model, and we show that no efficient algorithm can achieve approximation
ratio o(m/ lnm). On the other hand, for additive valuations, an algorithm with ap-
proximation ratio O(lnn) exists for computing a minimum size agreeable set; this is
complemented by the result that it is NP-hard to approximate the problem to within a
factor of (1− δ) ln n for any δ > 0.
We conclude the paper by listing some directions for future work. Firstly, in the
ranking model, it would be interesting to close the gap between our upper bound of m2 +
O(
√
m log logm) and the lower bound of m2 +O(1) by Suksompong [29] on the minimum
size necessarily agreeable set. Secondly, one can consider a probabilistic setting, where
the utilities of the agents are drawn from some distributions, and determine the size of
the smallest agreeable set that is likely to exist in such a setting. Thirdly, the question
of truthfulness has not been addressed in this or previous work. One can ask whether
similar approximation ratios can be obtained or whether additional limitations arise in
the presence of strategic agents. Finally, a related line of research, which has recently
received attention, is to design algorithms that fairly allocate items among groups of
agents [24, 30].
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A. NP-hardness of Balanced 2-Partition
In this section, we show that Balanced 2-Partition is NP-hard via a reduction from
2-Partition, a well-known NP-hard problem.
Lemma 6. Balanced 2-Partition is NP-hard.
Proof. We reduce from 2-Partition, a problem in which a set B of positive integers is
given and the goal is to decide whether there exists a set T ⊆ B such that ∑b∈T b =∑
b∈B\T b. 2-Partition is known to be NP-complete (see, e.g., [14]).
Given a 2-Partition instance, we create a Balanced 2-Partition instance as fol-
lows. Let A be the multiset containing all elements of B and |B| additional zeros.
Clearly, the reduction runs in polynomial time. We will next show that B is a YES
instance of 2-Partition if and only if A is a YES instance of Balanced 2-Partition.
(YES Case) Suppose that B is a YES instance of 2-Partition, i.e., there exists T ⊆ B
such that
∑
b∈T b =
∑
b∈B\T b. Let S ⊆ A be the multiset containing all elements of
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T and |B| − |T | additional zeros. Clearly, |S| = |B| = |A|/2 and ∑a∈S a = ∑b∈T b =∑
b∈B b/2 =
∑
a∈A a/2, meaning that A is a YES instance of Balanced 2-Partition
as desired.
(NO Case) We prove the contrapositive; suppose that A is a YES instance of Bal-
anced 2-Partition. This means that there exists S ⊆ A of size |A|/2 = |B| such that∑
a∈S a =
∑
a∈B\S a. Let T be the subset of B containing all elements of S whose corre-
sponding elements are included in B. Clearly, we have
∑
b∈T b =
∑
a∈S a =
∑
a∈B\S a =∑
b∈B\T b. Hence, B is a YES instance of 2-Partition.
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